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corners. Yet in the hands of a knowledgeable teacher who is able to
detect gaps and inaccuracies and to keep abreast of recent developments,
and of students who are inquisitive enough to fill in the missing links,
the book should become the vehicle for a most exciting and rewarding
educational venture.
STEFAN

A. RmsENFELD*

CoNsrrrunoNAL LAw: CASES, Co vmNrTs & QuEsnoNs. By William
B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, and Jesse H. Choper. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1964. lxiii + 1424 pages. $15.oo.

Many teachers despair, I suspect, of finding a suitable vehicle for a
critical examination of constitutional law in the basic course. Even the
best casebooks focus so sharply on broken series of factual resolutions
that, no matter how well the cases are grouped, the gaps can sometimes
be bridged only by an undesirable amount of lecturing which tends to
be superficial. Treatises in constitutional law bring to the subject a measure of coherence and continuity lacking in casebooks, but the demand for
economy has apparently made it infeasible to consider adequately all
that a given teacher regards as relevant. In any case, constitutional law
treatises are scarcely suitable for classroom use.
It is probably true that only in the vast periodical literature of constitutional law can a critical examination of that law be found. Few teachers can afford the luxury of binding much of that literature for use by
students, however, and few students have the time to wade through much
of it on their own. Usually, selections from periodicals are mere asides
in casebooks, passed off in string citations at the end of the cases. Occasionally, some teachers mimeograph selected bibliographies of their own,
to which they more or less "expect" their students to attend. The expectation is always uncertain, however, and probably less warranted than
we like to presume in easing our conscience.
Considerations such as these, plus the sheer enormity of the subject,
may account for something approaching a consensus of resignation about
the basic constitutional law course: circumstances have apparently reduced our opportunity to one of presenting an adequate survey of the
law. The special pleasures of critical examination seem reserved for enjoyment only in advanced courses and seminars. We compensate for the
infirmities of the basic course by proliferating electives in privacy, race
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relations, problems of church and state, the business of the Supreme
Court, and so on.
With these considerations in mind, the editors' prefatory claim for
this new casebook may seem a little brash. Dean Lockhart and Professors
Kamisar and Choper boldly declare that their primary aim is "to stimulate critical examination of the law and the trends."' Thus, the claim is
that this casebook offers a great deal more than a mere survey of constitutional law. The surprise, however, is not that the claim is made; it is
rather that the editors have actually succeeded in accomplishing their
aim so very, very well! They have done so principally by devoting much
of their materials to incisive periodical commentary and to the statement
of questions which strenuously test the scope, significance, and articulated rationale of the cases. In short, they have succeeded in blending
some of the best constitutional law literature with a variety of informed,
significant questions and a judicious selection of cases; the result is excellent. The blend is almost certain to force a high level of classroom
dialogue; it should indeed stimulate critical examination of the law.
It is therefore a pleasure to be able to recommend this book. Even in
schools where the few hours assigned to constitutional law will restrict
the basic course to more of a survey than the scope of this book comfortably contemplates, the teacher should still find it most helpful in preparing his own notes.
In other respects the book is orthodox. It is a useful orthodoxy, nonetheless, and the book can hardly be criticized on that account. Its organization, for instance, follows the currently standard tripartite division:
The nature and scope of judicial review; the sources, uses, and interaction
of national and state powers; and the limitations on governmental power
resulting from the first eight amendments and the civil war amendments. Subdivisions within the principal sections are also made along
lines currently observed in other, widely adopted, casebooks. The selection of cases differs in some particulars from that of other casebooks, of
course, just as other casebooks differ among themselves. But each of us
can determine the comparative merits of these differences only after a
more personal inspection of the book than can be secured vicariously
from the bias of a review such as this. The point to be made here is
simply that the book is more than good enough to merit that inspection.
Nor should consideration of this book be dropped merely because the
book is lengthy, which it clearly is. The use of small print and double
columns makes it even longer than the number of pages (I424) might
suggest. Nevertheless, the rampant growth of constitutional law today
1. P. ix.
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simply rules out any greater economy of style, especially since the editors
have been true to their aim of stimulating a critical examination of that
law. Additionally, the topical arrangement of subjects facilitates dropping particular sections from a course where everything cannot be covered, without doing damage to the sections which can be covered, for the
sections are relatively independent of one another. For example, the one
hundred pages devoted to state power to tax could well be deferred for
consideration in a separate course in state and local taxation without significantly affecting the classroom treatment of state power to regulate.
In any case, we tend too generally to lament the apparently continued
expansion of constitutional law casebooks in recent years. It is interesting to recall, for instance, that Professor Thayer's casebook,2 which was
published in 1895 (when constitutional law was surely no more complicated than it is now), required 2434 pages to cover the subject.
Roughly half of all the principal cases considered in the casebook here
reviewed were decided by the Supreme Court since i95o-a fact which
confirms another declared aim of the editors: to examine the trends of
the law. Viewed another way, roughly half of all the principal cases concern themselves with limitations on government power which can be
loosely described as limitations involving civil rights and civil liberties.
This emphasis necessarily contracts the sections on judicial review and
federalism, but here again the editors are faithful to their declared purpose of emphasizing the trends of the law. In the 1963-1964 Term, for
instance, forty of the fifty Supreme Court decisions accompanied by an
opinion and concerned with constitutional questions were within the
civil rights and civil liberties field. With eighty per cent of the Court's
constitutional opinions thus directed, the editors' allocation of a little
more than half of their materials to that subject is a fairly conservative
acknowledgment of the trend.
As a matter of fact, the one major oversight of the book may be in its
omission of cases and materials which would deal more adequately with
an aspect of civil rights and civil liberties of great significance today,
namely, the scope and constitutional bases of federal civil rights statutes.
Screws v. United States' and Williams v. United States,' which have
nearly emasculated the two major criminal statutes5 on constitutional
grounds, are not treated as principal cases. Nor is Collins v. Hardyman,6
which very nearly junked the civil analogue to section 241.' Monroe v.
2.
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Pape,' which rescued section I983' from oblivion and which makes it the
single most useful federal civil rights remedy outside the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,1" is never mentioned. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is treated

rather slightingly, and many other statutes descriptive of federal civil
rights authority are never considered. Many of these materials are covered in competitive casebooks, and their omission from this volume is a
serious defect, especially in view of the general emphasis of the book on
civil rights and liberties.
It may be that the editors considered that treatment of these statutes
and their interpretative cases would be inappropriate in the basic constitutional law course. Disagreement with this point of view might be based
on several considerations. First, the scope and construction of these statutes have considerable relevance to basic issues of federalism, which is
part of the foundation of a solid course in constitutional law. Secondly,
the interpretative cases provide some insights into techniques of judicial
analysis not provided equally well by other cases. Thirdly, the statutes
have a political and practical importance which ought not to be reserved
for consideration only by those few students who may find their way into
some small civil rights seminar. There being no other major course in
the usual law school curriculum where consideration of these statutes
would be more appropriate than in constitutional law, they should be
covered in constitutional law. This is not to insist, of course, that every
teacher should take them up; but it would have been helpful had the
editors made it possible to deal with them. Since this casebook should
otherwise enjoy its greatest success among those most interested in the
civil rights and liberties area of constitutional law, the omission seems
even more unfortunate.
On balance, however, the book is excellent, particularly in the selection of materials and questions to supplement the cases. This selection
does a great deal to place the book easily among the best available, and
possibly to make it the very best for stimulating a critical examination of
constitutional law.
WILLiAm W. VAN AusTYNE''
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